Introduction

53
Any self-organizing system must adapt to its surroundings if it is to continue existing. On a broad 54 timescale, population characteristics change to better fit the ecological niche, resulting in evolution 55 and speciation (1) . On a shorter timescale, organisms adapt to better exploit their environment 56 through the process of learning. The degree or rate of adaptation is also important. Depending on the 57 environment around the organism, specialization into a specific niche or favouring a more generalist 58 diminishes, likely because we have learned enough about the structure of the task to discern and 81 learn appropriate habits (12) . 82
How may our Active Inference agent learn and select habitual behaviours? To answer this question, 83
we introduce a novel feature to the Active Inference framework; namely, the ability to update one's 84 policy space. Technically, a prior probability is specified over a set of plausible policies, each of which 85 represents a sequence of actions through time. Policy learning is the optimisation of this probability 86 distribution, and optimising the structure of this distribution (i.e. 'structure learning') through 87
Bayesian model comparison. Habitual behaviour may emerge through pruning implausible policies, 88
and reducing the number of behaviours that an agent may engage in. If an agent can account for its 89 behaviour without calling on a given policy, it can be pruned, resulting in a reduced policy space, 90 allowing agents to infer which policy it is pursuing more efficiently. Note that in Active Inference, 91 agents have to infer the policy they are pursuing, where this inference is heavily biased by prior 92 beliefs and preferences about the ultimate outcomes. We argue that pruning of redundant 93 behavioural options can account for the phenomenon of specialization (behaviour highly adapted to 94 specific environments), and the accompanying loss of flexibility. In addition to introducing Bayesian 95 model reduction for prior beliefs about policies, we consider its biological plausibility, and its 96 relationship with processes like sleep that have been associated with structure learning (i.e., the 97 removal of redundant model parameters). Finally, through the use of illustrative simulations, we 98 show how optimising model structure leads to useful policies, the adaption of an agent to its 99 environment, the effect of the environment on learning and the costs and benefits of specialization. 100
In what follows, we will briefly review the tenets of Active Inference, describe our simulation set up 101 and then review the behavioural phenomenology in light of the questions posed above. 102
103
.
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Materials and Methods
104
Active Inference
105
Under Active Inference, agents act to minimize their variational free energy (13) and select actions 106 that minimises variational free energy expected following the action. This imperative formalises the 107 notion that an adaptive agent should act to avoid being in surprising states, should they wish to 108 continue their existence. In this setting, free energy acts as an upper bound on surprise and expected 109 free energy stands in for expected surprise or uncertainty. As an intuitive example, a human sitting 110 comfortably at home should not expect to see an intruder in her kitchen, as this represents a 111 challenge to her continued existence; as such, she will act to ensure that outcomes (i.e. whether or 112 not an intruder is present) match her prior preferences (not being in the presence of an intruder); 113 for example, by locking the door. 114
More formally, surprise is defined as the negative log probability of observed outcomes under the 115 agent's internal model of the world, where outcomes are generated by hidden states (which the 116 agents have no direct access to, but which cause the outcomes) that depend on the policies which the 117 agent pursues (14): 118 − ln ( ') = − ln [ ∑ ( ',, ) 1,2 ]
) 119
Here, ' = ( 4 , … , 6 ) and ̃= ( 4 , … , 6 ) correspond to outcomes (observations) and states 120 throughout time, respectively, and represents the policies (sequence of actions through time). 121
Since the summation above is typically intractable, we can instead use free energy as an upper bound 122 on surprise (3) : 123 = 9 [ ln (, ) − ln ( ',, ) ] (2) 124 .
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As an agent acts to minimize their free energy, they must also look forward in time and pursue the 125 policy which they expect would best minimize their free energy. The contribution to the expected 126 free energy from a given time, ( , ) , is the free energy associated with that time, conditioned on 127 the policy, and averaged with respect to a posterior predictive distribution (15) 
) 129
We can then sum over all future time-points (i.e. taking the path integral from the current to the final 130
FG>
) to arrive at the total expected free energy expected under each policy. 131
Partially observable Markov decision process and the generative model
132
A Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP, or MDP for short) is a generative model for 133 modelling discrete hidden states with probabilistic transitions that depend upon a policy. This 134 framework is useful for formalizing planning and decision making problems and has various 135 applications in artificial intelligence and robotics (16). An MDP comprises two types of hidden 136 variables which the agent must infer: hidden states () and policies ( ). An MDP agent must then 137 navigate its environment, armed with a generative model that specifies the joint probability 138 distribution of observed outcomes and their hidden causes, and the imperative of minimizing free 139 energy. The states, outcomes and policies are defined more concretely in the following sections. 140
The MDP implementation consists of the following matrices specifying categorical distributions (6): 141
state-outcome mapping 142
state-state transition 143
belief about initial states 145
independent policy prior 146
The generative model (Fig 1) assumes that outcomes depend upon states, and that current states 147 depend upon states at the previous timepoint and the action taken (as a result of the policy pursued). 148
Specifically, the state-outcome relationship is captured by an A (likelihood) matrix, which maps the 149 conditional probability of any i-th outcome given a j-th state. A policy, U = ( 4 , … , 6 ), is a sequence 150 of actions (u) through time, which the agent can pursue. Generally, an agent is equipped with multiple 151 policies it can pursue. Conceptually, these may be thought of as hypotheses about how to act. As 152 hidden states are inaccessible, the agent must infer its current state from the (inferred) state it was 153 previously in, as well as the policy it is pursuing. State-to-state transitions are described by the B 154 (transition) matrix. The C matrix encodes prior beliefs about (i.e. a probability distribution over) 155 outcomes, which are synonymous with the agent's preferences. This is because the agent wishes to 156 minimize surprise and therefore will endeavour to attain outcomes that match the distributions in 157 the C matrix. The D matrix is the prior belief about the agent's initial states (the agent's beliefs about 158 where it starts off). Finally, E is a vector of the belief-independent prior over policies (i.e. intrinsic 159 probability of each policy, without considering expected free energy). 160
161
. CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license is made available under a The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint 
167
A concept that will become important below is ambiguity. Assuming an agent is in the i-th hidden 168 states, U , the probable outcomes are described by a categorical distribution by the i-th column of the 169 A matrix. We can therefore imagine a scenario where the distribution ( > | > = ) has high entropy 170 (e.g. uniformly distributed), and outcomes are approximately equally likely to be sampled. This is an 171 ambiguous outcome. On the other hand, we can have the opposite situation with an unambiguous 172 outcome, where the distribution of outcomes given states has low entropy. In other words, "if I am in 173 this state, then I will see this and only this". This unambiguous, precise outcome allows the agent to 174 infer the hidden state that they are in. 175
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Crucially, under Active Inference, an agent must also infer which policy it is pursuing at each time 176
step. This is known as planning as inference (17). The requisite policy inference takes the form: 177
Here, represents a vector of sufficient statistics of the posterior belief about policies: i.e., 179 expectations that each allowable policy is currently in play. F is the free energy for each policy based 180 on past time points and G is the expected free energy for future time points. The free energy scores 181 the evidence that each policy is being pursued, while the expected free energy represents the prior 182 belief that each policy will reduce expected surprise or uncertainty in the future. The expected free 183 energy comprises two parts -risk and ambiguity. Risk is the difference between predicted and 184 preferred outcomes, while ambiguity ensures that policies are chosen to disclose salient information. 185
These two terms can be rearranged into epistemic and pragmatic components which, as one might 186 guess, reduce uncertainty about hidden states of the world and maximise the probability of preferred 187
outcomes. 188
The two quantities required to form posterior beliefs about the best policy (i.e., the free energy and 189 expected free energy of each policy) can be computed using the A, B, and C matrices (4,18). The 190 variable is an inverse temperature (precision) term capturing confidence in policy selection, and X 191 is the (expected log of the) intrinsic prior probabilities in the absence of any inference (this is covered 192 more in-depth in the "Policy Learning and Dirichlet Parameters" section below). The three quantities 193 are passed through a softmax function (which normalizes the exponential of the values to sum to 194 one). The result is the posterior expectation; namely, the most likely policy that the agent believes it 195 is in. This expectation enables the agent to select the action that it thinks is most likely.
196
Simulations and Task Set-up
197
We return to our question of the effect of the environment on policy learning via setting up a 198 simulated environment in which our synthetic agent (visualized as a mouse) forages (Figs 2A and 199 2C) . Our environment takes the form of a two-step maze inspired by (19), which is similar to that 200 used in previous work on Active Inference (3, 15) . The maze allows for an array of possible policies, 201 and the challenge for our agent is to learn to prioritize these appropriately. The agent has two sets of 202 beliefs about the hidden states of the world: where it is in the maze, and where the reward is. The 203 agent also receives two outcomes modalities: where it is in the maze and feedback received at each 204 location in the maze (Fig 2C, right) . The agent always knows exactly where it is in the maze (Fig 2A) , 205 and receives different "Feedback" outcomes, depending on where it is in the maze and the location 206 of the reward (Fig 2B) . where it thinks the reward is. The agent is able to make geographical observations to see where it is in the maze 229 (Fig 2A) , as well as receive a "feedback" outcome which gives it a cue to go a certain location, or to give it reward / 230 punishment ( Fig 2B) . The small numbers beside each arrow illustrate the ambiguity of the cues. As am example, we 
233
The mouse always starts in the same initial location (Fig 2A, position 1 ) and is given no prior 234 information about the location of the reward. This is simulated by setting matrix D such that the 235 mouse strongly believes that it is in the "initial location" at = 1 but with a uniform distribution 236 over the "reward location". The agent is endowed with a preference for rewarding outcomes and 237 wishes to avoid punishing outcomes (encoded via the C matrix). Cues are placed in the initial and 238 intermediate locations (cue left and cue right). While the agent has no preference for the cues per se, 239 it can leverage the cue information to make informed decisions about which way to go to receive the 240 reward. In other words, cues offer the opportunity to resolve uncertainty and therefore have salient 241 or epistemic value. Figure 2C shows the reward in the left-most final location, accompanied by an 242 unambiguous cue -the agent is 99% sure that "cue left" means that the reward is actually on the left. 243
This leads it to the correct reward location. The nature of the maze is such that the agent cannot move 244 backward; i.e., once it reaches the intermediate location it can no longer return to the initial location. 245
Once the agent gets to the final location, it will receive either a reward (if it is at the reward location) 246 or be punished. 247 .
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The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint To see the effect of training under different environments, we set up two different maze conditions: 248 a volatile environment, in which the reward can appear in any one of the 4 final locations with equal 249 frequencies, and a non-volatile environment, where the reward only appears on the two left final 250 locations ( Fig 3A) . Crucially, this volatility is between-trial, because these contingencies do not 251 change during the course of a trial. The mouse has no explicit beliefs about changes over multiple 252 trials. Two mice with identical initial parameters are trained in these two distinct environments. With 253 our set-up, each mouse can entertain 7 possible policies ( Fig 3B) . Four of the policies allow the mouse 254 to get to one of the final four locations, whereas three additional policies result in the mouse staying 
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint locations and staying there, and policy 7 has the agent not moving from its initial location for the entire duration of prior is placed over these distributions. Since the Dirichlet distribution is the conjugate prior for 287 categorical distributions, we can update our Dirichlet prior with categorical data and arrive at a 288 posterior that is still Dirichlet (20) . 289
While all model parameters can be learned (4,6,20), we focus upon policy learning. The priors are 290 defined as follows: 291
Here E is the Dirichlet distributed random variable (or parameter) that determines prior beliefs 293 about policies. The variables = ( 4 , … , b ) are the concentration parameters that parameterise the 294 Dirichlet distribution itself. In the following, k is the number of policies. Policy learning occurs via the 295 accumulation of e concentration parameters -the agent simply counts and aggregates the number of 296 times it performs each policy and this count makes up the e parameters. Concretely, if we define 2 = 297 .
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300 where = ( 4 + 2 d , … , b + 2 e ) is the posterior concentration parameter. In this way the Dirichlet 301 concentration parameter is often referred to as a "pseudo-count". Intuitively, the higher the e 302 parameter for a given policy, the more likely that policy becomes because more of Q(E)'s mass 303 becomes concentrated around this policy. Finally, we take the expected logarithm of E to compute 304 the posterior beliefs about policies in Equation 4: 305
The E vector can now be thought of as an empirical prior that accumulates the experience of policies 307 that are carried over from previous trials. In short, it enables the agent to learn about the sorts of 308 things that it does. This experience dependent prior policy enters inference via Equation 4. Before 309 demonstrating this experience dependent learning, we look at another form of learning known 310 variously as Bayesian model selection or structure learning. 311
Bayesian model comparison
312
In Bayesian model comparison, multiple competing hypotheses (i.e., models or the priors that defines 313 models) are evaluated in relation to existing data and the model evidence for each is compared (21). The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint parameters that are a weighted average under each model considered. This is especially important 318 in situations where there is no clear winning model (21) . 319
An organism which harbours alternative models of the world needs to consider its own uncertainty 320 about each model. The most obvious example of this is in the evaluation of different plausible courses 321 of action (policies), each entailing a different sequence of transitions. Such models need to be learnt 322 and optimised (22,23) and, rejected, should they fall short. Bayesian model averaging is used 323 implicitly in Active Inference when forming beliefs about hidden states of the world, where each 324 policy is regarded as a model and different posterior beliefs about the trajectory of hidden states 325 under each policy are combined using Bayesian model averaging. However, here, we will be 326 concerned with the Bayesian model averaging over the policies themselves. In other words, the 327 model in this instance becomes the repertoire of policies entertained by an agent. 328
There is an important connection between these model optimisation procedures, and those 329 processes thought to occur during sleep. This is because a variational free energy minimising 330 creature tries to optimise a generative model that is both accurate and simple -i.e. that uses the least 331 complicated explanation to describe the greatest number of observations. Mathematically, this 332 follows from the fact that surprise can be expressed mathematically as model evidence -and model 333 evidence is the difference between accuracy and complexity. During wakefulness, an organism 334 constantly receives perceptual information, and forms accurate yet potentially complex models to 335 explain this (neurobiologically, via increases in the number and strength of synaptic connections 336 through associative plasticity). During sleep, which lacks any precise sensory input, creatures can 337 optimise their models post hoc with the goal of reducing complexity (24). This can be achieved by 338 considering reduced (simpler) models and seeing how well they explain the data collected during 339 waking hours (22). This is sometimes called Bayesian model reduction and is analogous to the 340 .
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The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint synaptic homeostasis hypothesis of sleep (25). For an excellent review on sleep and model 341 optimisation, see (26), and for a review of Bayesian model reduction, see (27) . 342 Returning to our maze task, our artificial agents traverse through the maze each day and aggregate e 343 parameters (Equation 6) to form its daily posterior -that will serve as tomorrow's empirical prior. 344
During sleep, various reduced models are constructed, via strengthening and weakening 345
amalgamations of e parameters. For each configuration of these policy parameters, model evidence 346 is computed and BMA performed to acquire the optimal posterior, which becomes the prior for the 347 subsequent day. In brief, we evaluated the evidence of models in which each policy's prior 348 concentration parameter was increased by eight, while the remainder were suppressed (by factor of 349 two and four). This creates a model space -over which we can average to obtain the Bayesian model 350 average of concentration parameters in a fast and biologically plausible fashion. Please see S1 351
Appendix, section A.1 for a general introduction to Bayesian model reduction and averaging. S1 
Results
359
Learning
360
We now turn to our question about the effect of the environment on policy learning. Intuitively, useful 361 policies should acquire a higher e concentration, becoming more likely to be pursued in the future. 362
In simulations, one readily observes that policy learning occurs and is progressive, evident by the 363 increase in e concentration for frequently pursued policies (Fig 4) , which rapidly reach stable points 364 within 10 days (Fig 4B, see Fig 3C for the concept of "training days"). Interestingly, the relative policy 365 strengths attain stable points at different levels, depending on the environment in which the agent is 366 trained. In a conservative environment, the two useful policies stabilize at high levels ( ≈ 32), 367 whereas in a volatile environment, these four useful policies do not reach the same accumulated 368 strengths ( ≈ 25). Furthermore, the policies that were infrequently used are maintained at lower 369 levels when trained in a non-volatile environment ( ≈ 7 ), while they are more likely to be 370 considered for the agent trained in the volatile environment ( ≈ 11). 371 372 . 
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377
We will henceforth refer to the agent trained in the non-volatile environment as the specialist agent, 378 and the agent trained in the volatile environment as the generalist agent. Anthropomorphically, the 379 specialist agent is, a priori, more confident about what to do: since the reward has appeared in the 380 leftward location its entire life, it is confident that it will continue to appear in the left, thus it has 381 predilections for left-going policies (policies 1 and 2 of Fig 3B) . Conversely, the generalist agent has 382 seen reward appear in multiple locations, thus it experiences a greater level of uncertainty and 383 considers more policies as being useful, even the ones it never uses. We can think of these as being 384
analogous to a general practitioner, who must entertain many possible treatment plans for each 385 patient, compared to a surgeon who is highly skilled at a specific operation. 386 .
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We can also illustrate the effect of training on the agents' reward-acquisition rate: the rate at which 387 the agents successfully arrive at the reward location (Fig 5) . Here, we tested the agents after each 388 day's training. We see that (Fig 5B, left) with just a few days of training, the specialist agent learns 389 the optimal policies and its reward-acquisition rate becomes consistently higher than a naïve agent 390 with no preference over any of its policies ( mnUop = ( 4 , … , q ) = (1, … , 1) ). Conversely, the 391 generalist agent never becomes an expert in traversing its environment. While it learns to identify 392 the useful policies (Fig 5A, right) , its performance is never significantly better than the naïve agent 393 (Fig 5B, right) . Overall, we see that a non-volatile environment leads to specialization, whereas a 394 volatile environment leads to the agent becoming a generalist. 
CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license is made available under a
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint trials, where the reward location / frequency in the testing environment is identical to the environment in which 402 the agent is trained (i.e. a specialist agent is tested in an environment with low volatility and the reward always 403 being on the left of the initial location). The frequency is computed from how many out of the 32 trials the agent is 404 able to get to the true reward location.
406
Testing
407
We then asked how the specialist and generalist mice perform when transported to different 408 environments. We constructed three testing environments (Fig 6A) : the specialized environment, 409 similar to the environment the specialized agent is trained in; namely, with rewards that only appear 410 on the left side of the starting location (low volatility); the general environment containing rewards 411 that may appear in any of the four final locations (high volatility); additionally, the novel environment 412 has reward only on the right side of the starting location (low volatility). 
424
The specialized and general testing environment have identical reward location and frequencies to the 425 .
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Each agent was tested for 512 trials in each test environment. Note that the agents do not learn during 436 the testing phase -we simply reset the parameters in our synthetic agents after each testing trial to 437 generate perfect replications of our test settings. We observe that an untrained (naïve) agent has a 438 baseline reward-acquisition rate of ~60%. On the contrary, the specialist agent excels when the 439 environment is similar to that it trained in, performing at the highest level (89%) out all the agents. 440
In contrast, the specialist agent performs poorly in a general environment (46% reward-acquisition), 441 and fails all but one out of its 512 attempts in a novel environment where it needs to go in the opposite 442 direction to that of its training ( Figs 6B and 6C) . The generalist agent, being equally trained in all four 443 policies -that take it to one of the end locations -does not suffer from reduced reward-acquisition 444 when exposed to a new environment (the specialized environment or novel environment). However, 445 it does not perform better in a familiar, general environment either. The agent's reward-acquisition 446 remains around 60% across all testing environments, similar to that of a naïve agent ( Figs 6B and  447 
6C). 448
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The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint Overall, we find that becoming a specialist versus a generalist has sensible trade-offs. The benefit of 449 specialization is substantial when operating within the same environment, consistent with data on 450 this topic in a healthcare setting (28,29). However, if the underlying environment is different, then 451 performances can decrease to one which is poorer than the performance without specialization. 452
Drawing once again from healthcare, the benefits of generalising are numerous as it allows for the 453 practitioner to react more flexibly to changing demography and societal perspectives (30). 454
Conversely, being a generalist means the agent never thrives in a single environment. 455
456
Discussion
457
Specialists and Generalists
458
Our focus in this paper has been on policy optimisation, where discrete policies are optimised 459 through learning and Bayesian model reduction. By simulating the development of specialism and 460 generalism, we illustrated the capacity of a generalist to perform in a novel environment, but its 461 failure to reach the level of performance of a specialist in a specific environment. We now turn to a 462 discussion of the benefits and costs of expertise. Principally, the drive towards specialization (or 463 expertise) is the result of the organism's imperative to minimize free energy. As free energy is an 464 upper bound on surprise (negative Bayesian model evidence), minimizing free energy maximizes 465 model evidence (31). As model evidence takes into account both the accuracy and complexity of an 466 explanation (22), it is clear that having a parsimonious model that is well-suited to the environment 467 -a specialist model -will tend to minimize free energy over time, provided the environment does 468 not change. 469 .
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In a stable (conservative, non-volatile) setting, a complex environment can be distilled down into a 470 simple model without sacrificing accuracy. This results in efficient policy selection and provides a 471 theoretical framework for understanding the formation of expertise. In our simulations, the agent 472 trained in the unchanging environment learns to favour the two policies that go left, as the reward is 473 always on the left of the starting location. It thus becomes more efficient and acts optimally in the 474 face of uncertainty. This is evident by its excellent performance in finding left-situated rewards (Fig  475   6) . Indeed, previous theories of expertise differentiate experts from novices in their ability to 476 efficiently generate complex responses to their domain-specific situations (32-34). For example, in 477 typists, expertise is most well-characterized by the ability to quickly type different letters in 478 succession using different hands (33, 35) . In essence, the expert needs to quickly select from her 479 repertoire of motor policies the most appropriate to type the desired word. This is a non-trivial 480 problem: using just the English alphabet, there are a total of 26 s ways of typing an -character-long 481 word (e.g. a typist needs to select from 26 u = 308915776 policies to type the 6-letter word 482 "EXPERT"). It is no wonder that a beginner typist struggles greatly and needs to forage for 483 information by visually searching the keyboard for the next character after each keystroke. The 484 expert, on the other hand, has an optimised prior over her policy space, and thus is able to efficiently 485 select the correct policies to generate the correct character sequences. 486
However, specialization does not come without its costs. The price of expertise is reduced flexibility 487 when adapting to new environments, especially when the new settings are contradictory to previous 488 settings (11, 36) . Theoretically, the expert has a simplified model of their domain, and, throughout 489 their extensive training, has the minimum number of parameters necessary to maintain their model's 490 high accuracy. Consequently, it becomes difficult to fit this model to data in a new, contradictory 491 environment that deviates significantly from the expert's experience. For instance, we observe that 492 .
The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint people trained in a perceptual learning task perform well in the same task, but perform worse than 493 naïve subjects when the distractor and target set are reversed -and take much longer to re-learn the 494 optimal response than new subjects who were untrained (37). 495
Conversely, a volatile environment precludes specialization. The agent cannot single-mindedly 496 pursue mastery in any particular subset of policies, as doing so would come at the cost of reduced 497 accuracy (and an increase in free energy). The generalist agent therefore never reaches the level of 498 performance that the specialist agent is capable of at its best. Instead, the generalist performs barely 499 above the naïve average reward-acquisition rate, even when tested under a general environment. 500
However, the generalist is flexible. When placed in novel and changing environments, it performs 501 much better than our specialist agent. 502
Interestingly, we note that specialist formation requiring a conservative training environment 503 adheres to the requirements specified by K. Anders Ericsson in his theory of deliberate practice -a 504 framework for any individual to continuously improve until achieving mastery in a particular field 505 (34,38,39). Ericsson establishes that deliberate practice requires a well-defined goal with clear 506 feedback (low volatility learning environment) and ample opportunity for repetition and refinement 507 of one's performance (training, repetition and, potentially, Bayesian model reduction during sleep). 508
Ways of Learning
509
There are two principal modes of (policy) learning. The first is learning via reduction, which entails a 510 naïve agent that starts with an over-complete repertoire of possible policies, who then learns to 511 discard the policies that are not useful. This is how we have tackled policy learning here; specifically, 512 via optimising a Dirichlet distribution over policies, using Bayesian model reduction. By starting with 513 an abundance of possible policies, we ensure that the best policy is likely to always be present. This 514 .
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The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint also corresponds with the neurobiological findings of childhood peaks in grey matter volume and 515 number of synapses, followed by adolescent decline (40) (41) (42) . In this conceptualization, as children 516 learn they prune away redundant connections, much as our agents triage away redundant policies. 517
Likewise, as the policy spaces are reduced and made more efficient, we also observe a corresponding 518 adolescent decline in brain glucose usage (43). This is consistent with the idea that informational 519 complexity is metabolically more expensive (44). 520
The second method of learning is learning via expansion. Here, we start with a very simple model and 521 increase its complexity until a more optimal model is reached. Concretely, this problem of increasing 522 a parameter space is one addressed by Bayesian Nonparametric modelling (45), and has been 523 theorized to be utilized biologically for structure learning to infer hidden states and the underlying 524 structures of particular situations (46, 47) . 525
Hyperpriors and Evolution
526
Note that the way in which we define our reduced model influences how learning of the e parameters 527 proceeds. Recall that to explore a plausible model space of priors, we increased concentration 528 parameters by 8 and divided the others by either 2 and 4. These changes were hand-crafted and 529 somewhat arbitrary, and are basically used to assess the change in model evidence when prior beliefs 530 in a particular policy are strengthened, relative to others. The exact ways in which the repertoire of 531 reduced models could be specified in terms of as hyperparameters, and reasonably there would be 532 hyperpriors, which are prior distributions over hyperparameters. 533
Similar to model parameters, hyperpriors can be optimised over time to reduce the path integral of 534 free energy. For example, in Bayesian model reduction there can be different settings for how much 535 to increment concentration parameters, and different degrees of comprehensiveness when it comes 536 . bioRxiv preprint to exploring the reduced model space (i.e. whether or not to iterate through all possible combinations 537 of policies). If one subscribes to the notion that this kind of structure learning occurs during sleep, 538 optimising hyperparameters becomes a behavioural scheduling problem. The organism can sleep 539 more frequently to compute empirical priors for the next period of waking, or it can spend more time 540 awake to gather empirical data. Both periods (sleep and wake) offer different advantages, and the 541 balance between them is a delicate equilibrium -influenced by ecological pressures. One can imagine 542 that the species-specific circadian rhythms maintain this optimum and evolution helps to fine-tune 543 the hyperparameters facilitating this schedule (48, 49) . 544
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Bayesian model comparison
545
In our simulations, we optimised policy strengths through the process of Bayesian model reduction 546 (to evaluate the free energy or model evidence of each reduced model), followed by model averaging 547 -in which we take the weighted average over all reduced models. However, BMA is just one way of 548 using model evidences to form a new model. Here, we discuss other approaches to model 549 comparison, their pros and cons, and biological implications. The first is Bayesian model selection, in 550 which only the reduced model with the greatest evidence is selected to be the prior for the future, 551 without consideration of competing models. This offers the advantage of reduced computational cost 552 (no need to take the weighted sum during the averaging process) at the cost of a myopic selection -553 the uncertainty over reduced models is not taken into account. 554
The second method, which strikes a balance between BMA and Bayesian model selection with respect 555 to the consideration of uncertainty, is BMA with Occam's Window (50). In short, a threshold is 556 established, z , and if the log evidence of any reduced model is not within z , we simply do not 557 consider that reduced model. Neurobiologically, this would correspond to the effective silencing of a 558 synapse if it falls below a certain strength (51). This way, multiple reduced models and relative 559 . CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license is made available under a The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint uncertainties are still considered, but a great degree of computational cost is saved since less reduced 560 models are considered overall. 561
Interestingly, the Occam's window itself can also be thought of as a hyperprior. A wide window (high 562 z ) means more models are considered, which offers a more optimal averaged prior but at higher 563 computational costs; a narrow window (low z ) means only the models with high model evidence 564 are considered. This allows for efficient averaging over only the best models but comes at the cost of 565 strict pruning. Likewise, both strategies offer different advantages, and the optimal balance may 566 depend on the nature of the agent's environment (i.e., is it an environment that provides definitive 567 evidence for a small number of policies -or is it an ambiguous environment?). A deviation from the 568 optimum may result in reduced fitness and suboptimal inference -a potentially useful perspective 569 on psychopathology in neuropsychiatric illnesses. For instance, an overly strict pruning rule -while 570 being highly efficient for policy optimisation -may result in useful policies being forever lost. This 571 sub-optimal form of structure learning may relate to the aberrant pruning which in schizophrenic 572 patients (52), leading to maladaptive policy spaces and policy-derived priors that could drive 573
hallucinations. 574
Limitations
575
One limitation of our simulations was that our agents did not learn about cues at the same time they 576 were learning about policies; in fact, the agents were constructed with priors on which actions were 577 likely to lead to rewards, given specific cues (that is, a correctly perceived cue-left was believed by 578 the agents to -and actually did -always lead to a reward on the left). As such, we did not model the 579 learning of cue-outcome associations and how these may interact with habit formation. We argue 580 this is a reasonable approximation to real behaviour; where an animal or human first learns how cues 581 . CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license is made available under a The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint are related to outcomes, and, once they have correctly derived a model of environmental 582 contingencies, can then proceed to optimising policy selection. 583 Additionally, while we were able to see a significant performance difference between specialist and 584 generalist agents, there was little distinction between the performance of generalist and naïve agents. 585
This likely resulted from the "two-step" maze being a relatively simple task. As agents are 586 incentivized to go to the very end of the maze to receive a reward, the naïve agents are not at a 587 disadvantage compared to generalists (since both have equal prior beliefs about the final locations). 588
An alternative explanation is that the generalist strategy is simply the preservation of naivety. 589
To address the above limitations, future work could involve more complex tasks to more clearly 590 differentiate between specialist, generalist and naïve agents. Additional types of learning should also 591 be included, such as the learning of state-outcome mappings (optimising the model parameters of 592 the likelihood (A) matrix, as described in (4,6)), to understand how learning of different 593 contingencies influence one another. In addition, more complex tasks may afford the opportunity to 594 examine the generalisation of specialist knowledge to new domains (53). This topic has recently 595 attracted a great deal of attention from the artificial intelligence community (54, 55) . 596
Furthermore, it would be interesting to look at policy learning using a hierarchical generative model, 597
as considered for deep temporal models (56). This likely leads to a more accurate account of 598 expertise-formation, as familiarity with a domain-specific task should occur at multiple-levels of the 599 neural-computation hierarchy (e.g. from lower level "muscle memory" to higher level planning). 600
Likewise, more unique cases of learning can also be explored, such as the ability and flexibility to re-601 learn different tasks after specializing, the influence of sleep deprivation on policy learning, and 602 different ways of conducting model comparison (as discussed above). 603 .
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604
Conclusion
605
In conclusion, we have presented a computational model under the theoretical framework of Active 606
Inference that equips an agent with the machinery to learn habitual policies via a prior probability 607 distribution over its policy space. In our simulations, we found that agents who specialize -608 employing a restricted set of policies because these were adaptive in their training environment -609 can perform well under ambiguity but only if the environment is similar to its training experiences. 610
On the contrary, a generalist agent can more easily adapt to changing, ambiguous environments, but 611 is never as successful as a specialist agent in a conservative environment. These findings cohere with 612 the previous literature on expertise formation -as well as with common human experience. Finally, 613 these findings may be important in understanding aberrant inference and learning in 614 
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We begin by writing out Bayes rule to both the full and reduced models: 797
Using the equality in Equation A2 to cancel the likelihood terms, and rearranging, we arrive at the 799 following equality: 800
Integrating both sides: 802
[ Taking The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint 811 Equation A5 tells us that the model evidence of any reduced model can be evaluated given the prior 812 of the reduced and full models, and the evidence of the full model. Applying the above knowledge to 813 the e concentration parameters defined previously, we have the following: 814
Prior of the full model 815
Prior of the full model 816
Prior of the full model 817
Prior of the full model 818
In order to compare relative model evidence, we look at the log ratio of the reduced and full model 819 evidence, which is the same as the difference in their free energy (free energy of the full model minus 820 the reduced): 821
In the discrete case, the above can simply be re-written with Beta functions Β(⋅) (26): 823
We can apply the above to any reduced model to evaluate its evidence relative to the full model. 825
Intuitively, the higher Δ is, the more evidence the reduced model has. We can evaluate Δ for an 826 arbitrarily large number of reduced models. 827 . CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license is made available under a The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint
In the case of Bayesian model selection, the reduced model with the highest model evidence is selected 828 as the optimal model. That is to say, given a vector of the relative free energy for each reduced model, 829 ΔF , we pick the z which gives max (ΔF) . However, since we are interested in Bayesian model 830 averaging, we need to compute the probability of each reduced model within the entire reduced 831 model space we defined: 832
where U = ( = ) is the posterior probability of each reduced model and is the softmax 834
, which squashes the set of values in vector ΔF into a range that is between 835
[0, 1] and sums to 1 (i.e. forms a probability distribution). After the probability of each reduced model 836 is computed, we simply take a weighted sum of each reduced model parameters, weighted by their 837 probability, to get the final, Bayesian model averaged parameters: 838
where U,z is a vector of the i-th concentration parameters for each reduced model, and U,""• is the 840 i-th Bayesian model averaged concentration parameter over all reduced models. 841
842
A.2 Example application of Bayesian model comparison to maze task 843
Taking our "two-step" maze task for example, let us imagine an agent that repeatedly pursues policy 844 1 (Fig 3B) throughout the day. At the end of the day, having completed 8 trials, its e parameter for 845 policy 1 has increased from a prior concentration of 1 to a posterior concentration of 9 (Fig A1a) . The 846 . CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license is made available under a The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint agent then goes to sleep, where it entertains possible combinations of reduced models for prior e 847 parameters (Fig A1b) and computes the model evidence for each reduced model using the 848 derivations shown in Appendix section A.1 (the resulting model evidence is shown in Fig A1c) . 849
Specifically, it tests different initial parameters (Fig A1b) in lieu of the true prior parameters used 850 (Fig A1a, left) to see whether these provide better explanations for the observed data (Fig A1a, right) . to computed the BMA-ed posterior e concentration, which is used as the prior for the next day. 865
866
The reduced models (Fig A1b) are constructed via strengthening certain policies (increasing their e 867 parameters, akin to synaptic strengthening) and weakening others (decreasing e parameters, akin to 868 synaptic pruning). The point is to construct many reduced models such that the model space is more 869 likely to contain many good models, and a search through them will pick up those good models 870 (hypothetically, the reduced model space can be arbitrarily large). In our case, we increment the e 871 parameter of the to-be-strengthened policies by 8 and divide the e of to-be-weakened policies by 2 872 . CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 International license is made available under a The copyright holder for this preprint (which was not peer-reviewed) is the author/funder. It . https://doi.org/10.1101/644807 doi: bioRxiv preprint or 4. The reason for this numerical manipulation is twofold. Firstly, it is more neurobiologically 873 plausible to weaken policies (e.g. via weakening synaptic connections, or in our case, decreasing the 874 e parameter by dividing) over time as supposed to "deleting" policies altogether when they are not 875 used. In practice, when the probability of a policy becomes sufficiently small, we can associate this 876 with the pruning of the synapses. Secondly, it is beneficial to construct a large reduced model space, 877 which helps Bayesian model reduction to find a more optimal reduced model. In total, each time 878 model reduction occurs, it iterates through all combinations of reduced policies (since we have 7 879 policies and we can either strengthen or weaken each one, we have 2 q = 128 combinations) with the 880 two levels of pruning discussed above for a total of 256 reduced models to average over. Figure A1b , 881 left is an example of a reduced model, in which policy 1 is strengthened (more probable), and all 882 other policies weakened. This is the reduced model with the best model evidence, since it 883 corresponds with the agent's action during the day (Fig A1a, right) . 884
Now that the probability of each model within the reduced model space is computed (Equation A7, 885 visualized in Fig A1c) , we perform Bayesian model averaging get a weighted sum over all the models 886 (Equation A8). The resulting prior ( ""• ) is the optimal set of prior parameters that the agent could 887 have started the previous day with, given the reduced models considered. Finally, the amount of 888 learning (i.e. increases in e for policy 1 by 8) is added to this "optimised prior" to get the most optimal 889 posterior e concentration, (Fig A1d, right) , which is used as the prior concentration for the 890 subsequent day. This is the posterior that the mouse would have reached, had it started with the best 891 prior. This process repeats after each day of training, where the agent continually optimises its 892 parameters to inform better future policy selection. 893
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